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Abstract— When faced with learning new skills or trying to
solve problems humans sometimes have a choice, either learn the
skill oneself (individual learning) or alternatively learn the skill
from someone who already has that knowledge (social learning).
Learning from another has the advantage of bypassing a long
and costly search process and can therefore speed up learning
by exploiting the knowledge of the other. It may also be the case
that new and original solutions to problems may never be found
when searching for them individually whereas readily available
solutions may be found by exploiting the knowledge of another.
Imitation is one mechanism which allows this knowledge transfer
to take place.
In this paper comparisons of selected theories underlying
imitation and how these may be useful from a robotics viewpoint
and especially a robot learner are presented. Many of these
theories underlie existing robotic implementations and thus to
understand the efficacy of these robot learners an understanding
of the underlying concepts may prove useful and necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imitative learning, where an agent typically learns new
skills by observing and repeating the behaviour of others, is
a powerful mechanism for knowledge acquisition and seems
to be a key characteristic of human forms of intelligence.
Imitation is thought to play a role in the formation of social
relationships [1], cultural transmission [2], [3] and language
acquisition [4] and seems to be central in the process by which
humans become social beings [5]. This process of socialisation
may have been the evolutionary reinforcing driver which both
led to the high level of imitative skills in humans and to further
degrees of socialisation which in turn led to higher imitative
abilities [6]. One of the key features of highly developed social
skill is the identification of others as people, and specifically
as “like me” [7], as well as the ability to be empathic by being
able to judge the feelings or internal states of others.
From a robotics and computer science viewpoint, imitation
can be considered as an efficient way of learning that might
avoid the need for complex programming and reduce the need
for robotics experts by providing a straightforward way in
which non-specialists can instruct artificial systems to carry
out useful tasks. Imitation and its role in the development
of social beings is also becoming very important in robotics
research as it becomes increasingly apparent that to co-exist
with humans robots will require social skills and the ability
to empathise with others [8]. Imitation is still however a deep
and hard problem and research continues in studying what the
neuro-biological features are which support imitation and how
imitation can be implemented within artificial systems.
In this paper we focus on this latter point and present
some comparisons of three important theories of imitation
and how these may considered from a robotics viewpoint.
We hope that this will prove useful for those involved in
the development of robots by highighting the main issues that
should be considered in an imitative architecture.
II. WHAT’S IMPORTANT FOR ROBOTIC IMITATION?
In this section some of the main proposals emanating from
developmental and neuro-psychology will be presented in
order to understand various theoretical ideas that are current
in imitation research. A comparison of these theories and their
power to explain key issues in imitation will be discussed in
order to provide a firm basis for the decisions on the robotic
mechanisms for social learning. The comparison is based on
a set of questions against which the various theories can be
compared. Although these questions arise from human specific
questions in imitation research they can also be considered in
terms of whether the theory can be realistically realised in a
robotic implementation.
The theoretic proposals tend to be either specialist in that
a specific mechanism for imitation is purported to exist, or
generalist, in that existing mechanisms for learning and action
control are employed [9]. In this study the following questions
are considered to be those which the theoretic proposals should
consider:
• How is the correspondence problem addressed or solved?
• How does the theory address the problem of perceptual-
motor translation?
• Is the theory compatible with research on mirror neurons?
• Does the theory employ mechanisms compatible
with kinesthetic-visual matching, mirror imitation and
self/assisted-imitation?
• Can the theory be realistically implemented in a robotic
system?
It is not suggested that these are the only issues that a theory
of imitation employed in a robotic system should address,
however this set of questions considers issues which are at
the heart of imitation research and some of which may be
key to the design of an artificial mechanism and as such their
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interpretation should provide clues as to the effectiveness of
the mechanisms proposed.
III. ISSUES IN IMITATION
One debate on human imitation centres on whether imitation
is an innate and specialist activity that is present in humans at
birth or alternatively whether imitation is a feature which exists
as part of a generalist sensorimotor mechanism [10]. The latter
explanation being important as it then proposes that imitative
behaviour can be learned - thus humans learn how to imitate
as well as learn from imitation. From a robotics perspective
this is an important distinction as it emphasises the need for
an adaptive mechanism providing a facility whereby imitative
abilities can be acquired as well as the ability to acquire further
task knowledge from existing imitative abilities. This section
examines aspects of human imitative behaviour which give
rise to this debate.
A. Imitation in Infants and Neonates
It is believed that very young babies exhibit imitative
behaviour by facial imitation. Typically this involves tongue
protrusion, lip protrusion and mouth opening. These have been
studied by a number of researchers (e.g. [11], [12]) and these
effects are taken by Meltzoff and Moore [13] as evidence
that neo-natal imitation is an innate mechanism which does
not necessarily require learning, i.e. humans do not need
to learn how to imitate. A review study by Anisfeld [14]
however suggested that only tongue protrusion showed any
correlation with observation of the model movements. This
finding has been taken by Heyes [10] as an indication that
tongue protrusion may be an innate releasing mechanism
(IRM). Heyes states “If tongue protrusion is the only body
movement that newborns can imitate, it is plausible that it
is an IRM; an inborn stimulus-response link, wherein the
response coincidentally resembles the stimulus from a third
party perspective” [10, p. 253]. This implies that imitation may
be a generalist activity and therefore require that imitation be
learned. However, studies by Meltzoff [7] indicate that over
time neonates refine their tongue protrusion skills matching
not only protrusions but movements to the right and left of the
mouth. This would conversely suggest that tongue protrusion
cannot be an IRM. The scientific debate on neonatal imitation
is still ongoing.
B. Kinesthetic-visual Matching, Mirror imitation and Self-
imitation
Kinesthesis (including somathesis - the feeling of the outline
of the body) is the perceptual system that “informs about
the position and movement of parts of the body” [15, p.
449]. To experience kinesthesis requires that the body moves.
Kinesthetic-visual matching occurs between the kinesthetic
feelings and the visual feedback from observing the move-
ment. This movement can be from observing one’s own
body movements, observing movements in a mirror or the
observation of the movements of another. It can also be
considered that the process of self or assisted imitation [16],
[17] in animals and/or robots can be another form of sensory-
motor matching. This is defined as a multi-modal association
of the movement of an individual’s body parts combined with
the matching of visual and other environmental stimuli.
C. The Correspondence Problem
At a general level imitation may be hypothesised to involve
some form of copying and some mechanism for assessing
similarity between the actions of the model and the actions
of the imitator. This presents some difficult challenges. How
does the imitator match the model’s body with the equivalent
parts of its own body especially so if the bodies are different?
If this matching is successful how does it match the orientation
of actions made by the model? E.g. is a mirroring of actions
correct or an exact match? Assuming that this problem is
solved, does the imitator match the goals of the model (e.g.
start the car) or the actions of the model (e.g. turn the key)?
How can the similarity of the mapping be measured? This
general problem in imitation is called the “Correspondence
Problem” [18] and can be stated in terms of matching states
(of the body) and effects (on objects and environment), actions
both internal and external to the imitator that transform the
state, subgoals and goals that describe configurations of state
and granularity as a measure the fineness of the matching
attempt. Solving correspondence problems is one of the key
challenges in imitation research.
D. Mirror Neurons
Mirror neurons are brain cells discovered in the premotor
area of monkey brains which appear to be active when the
monkey observes a goal-directed action made by another
monkey (or human) and when it executes that action itself [19].
There is also evidence that similar cells exist in human brains
in the prefrontal motor cortex and in Broca’s area which
is analogous to the premotor F5 area of the money brain.
It has been suggested that this reflects a link between non-
verbal communication and language via imitation [4], [20]
and as the mechanism which allows empathic abilities to
exist in humans via the ability to experience what others
may be experiencing [21]. It may be that in some animal
species the imitative ability of mirror neurons has resulted
from exaptation, and thus used by the animal for something
other than its original purpose. This being the case, it can then
be argued that mirror neurons are not specifically for imitation,
but “acquire their properties in the course of ontogeny as
a side-effect of the operation of general associative learning
and action control processes” [9, p. 489]. This idea is also
supported by evidence that mirror neurons for tool use can
develop during ontogeny [22] and therefore that learning has
a key function in their ontogenesis.
IV. THEORIES OF IMITATION - ASSESSMENT AND
EXAMPLES OF ROBOTIC IMPLEMENTATIONS.
In the sections that follow the following selected theories
of imitation will be discussed:
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• Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM) - (Meltzoff and Moore
(1997) [13]).
• Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) - (Heyes and Ray
(2000) [23]).
• Extended Ideomotor Theory (EIT) - (Prinz (2005) [24]).
A. Active Intermodal Mapping
One of the puzzles facing researchers in imitation is the
ability of the imitator to replicate movements seen in others
when they cannot see themselves perform the same action,
thus imitating perceptually opaque movements. Meltzoff and
Moore [13] address this problem in their theory (see figure 1)
by attempting to explain imitation by infants of facial move-
ments in adult models.
Fig. 1. Active Intermodal Mapping Theory. External and internal per-
ceptions are represented in a common form of organ relations. These are
compared. A match implies that the imitation was successful and may indicate
a “like me” condition. A mismatch implies that some movement is necessary.
The movement is extracted from a directory of coordinated acts previously
built from body babbling. (Figure inspired from [13]).
In their proposal a special purpose mechanism is suggested
that takes input from observation of the model’s movements
and converts these to a ‘supramodal’ encoding as a set of
‘organ relations’. Proprioceptive feedback from the imita-
tor’s own motor outputs are also encoded in this form. The
two representations are then compared in a kinesthetic-visual
matched ‘goal-directed’ selection process. The equivalence
of the relations implying a matching state. Non-equivalence
causes a search for a match of the visual perception against
prior experiences (in this case body babbling) and the nearest
coordinated act is executed. Thus the flow of control forms
a feedback loop where the matching experiences inform the
imitator of similarity between the model and itself, whereas
differences invoke movements in an attempt to gain similarity.
The explanatory power of AIM is best when proposing
mechanisms that explain opaque imitation situations, goal-
directness and thus intention. However, it has a number
of problems. Firstly, the theory is weak when describing
the structure of ‘organ relation’ encoding or how the organ
relations are derived from body movements. This makes it
difficult to address the correspondence problem issue directly.
Secondly, it is based on evidence from neonatal facial imitation
such as tongue protrusion, however these movements (as
described in section III-A above) may be due to an innate
releasing mechanism within the infant and as such inconsistent
with imitative learning [10] although Meltzoff and Moore [13]
suggest that corrective refinement of movements implies that
this must be an in-built imitative function. Thirdly, AIM
in suggesting that imitation is a special purpose mechanism
implies that a specialised collection of neurons will be at its
functional core, which may be consistent with the ideas behind
mirror neurons, however it is not consistent with the evidence
that imitation is experience dependent in primates and thus a
generalist learning/adaptive mechanism must be present, e.g.
mirror neurons may support imitation but may not specifically
have evolved for imitation. Finally, because there is little detail
on how organ relations are encoded the similarity mechanisms
underlying mirror imitation and self-imitation are difficult to
address.
A common problem with all of the theories of imitation
presented in this section is the descriptive nature of the
execution of actions. There are many ways of executing an
action however the theories are typically vague on the detail
involved. A possible strength of AIM from a robotic viewpoint
is however that although ‘organ relations’ are weakly defined,
the nature of the theory lends itself to implementation in
artificial systems. As such, many aspects of AIM have been
successfully realised in a number of robotic architectures (see
[25]–[29] for examples).
B. Associative Sequence Learning
Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) is based on a set
of bi-directional excitatory links between sensor and motor





















Fig. 2. Associative Sequence Learning Theory. Vertical associations are
between perceived model actions and the imitators motor programs. Direct
vertical associations have no intermediate representation. Indirect links are
mediated by another sensory representation (such as a word or phrase).
Horizontal associations connect the vertical associations in a chain or
sequence of motor actions. (Figure redrawn from [30]).
An action is based on a sequence of these movement units
(see figure 2). The horizontal sensory processes (shown at
the top of figure 2) are associated. Thus when observing the
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movements of the model the visual representations are linked
in a chain. It is suggested that this linking occurs either as
an activation list where the previous process activates the
next or through a context based model where the sensory
representations are associated with a time varying control
signal [30, p. 518]. Thus the observer learns the sequence
of actions made by the model. However in order to replicate
these actions ‘vertical’ associations between these sensory
inputs and motor representations are necessary, the association
formed by Hebbian learning. Motor units are representations
of kinesthetic feedback perceived through the execution of
the motor action. In ASL, the vertical associations between
sensory stimuli and the motor units must be pre-learned. Heyes
proposed two types of vertical link: direct links where a
movement unit is observed and paired with the sensory input,
and indirect links where an alternative sensory stimulus (e.g. a
verb or word) is paired with the motor action. Direct links can
be formed firstly through self-observation where the imitator
observes its own movements, secondly via mirrors where the
imitator can observe perceptually opaque movements, thirdly
where the imitator observes the model imitating the imitator,
fourthly from synchronous action responses of both the model
and imitator to a common stimulus and finally from instructor
feedback.
ASL is based on kinesthetic-visual matching and explicitly
proposes that imitative associations are formed as described
above. The mechanism of perceptual-motor translation is im-
plicit in the mechanism described. ASL supports the gener-
alist stance and is therefore consistent with of the idea of
mirror neurons being an exaptation. However in terms of
addressing the correspondence problem, ASL suggests that
the appropriate translations can be addressed as described
above (experiencing others, synchronous actions, instructor
feedback). However all of the cases present the same logical
difficulty (for reviews see [31] and [32]) in that there is
nothing which tells the imitator when the actions they see
in others correspond to actions in themselves. Thus ASL
appears to presuppose that the correspondence problem has
already been solved [31]. This leads to one of the practical
implementation difficulties posed by ASL in finding ways
of resolving the vertical links. Some researchers therefore
focus on the horizontal links and then hard-code the vertical
associations (see for example [33]). However, Alissandrakis et
al. [34] use given metrics to generate different correspondences
in the vertical mapping.
C. Extended Ideomotor Theory
Ideomotor theory was originally proposed by William
James [35] based on earlier work by Lotze [36] as a way
of explaining voluntary behaviour or ‘will’. All actions are
held as ‘images’ of the sensory feedback they produce, the
sensory stimulation resulting from the internal feedback from
the movements of the body as well as external feedback
from the effects on the environment. In the Lotze-James
approach actions are initiated as a result of imagining their
sensory consequences i.e. replicating the sensory feedback
experienced.
“Every representation of a movement awakens in some
degree the actual movement which is its object; and awakens
it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from doing
so by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously in
the mind” [35].
In this way actions are a means of realising intentions
(an ideomotor effect), rather than as consequences of sensory
stimulation (a sensorimotor effect). Because this approach
requires that the effects of the action precede the action itself,
Lotze-James proposed that these imagined consequences of
action are originally derived from previous learning. Thus the
first step is to store a collection of ‘ideas of movement’ from
previous learning.
“When a particular movement, having once occurred in a
random, reflex or involuntary way, has left an image of itself
in the memory, then the movement can be desired again and
deliberately willed” [35].
The distinction between voluntary or willed/intentional ac-
tions and involuntary actions is not however exact. There are
many instances of involuntary actions occurring even though
our intention is focused elsewhere. It is thought that this allows
skilled actions to be carried out without conscious thought.
William James gives an example of this effect where, when
dressing for dinner, individuals would end up getting into bed
“. . . merely because that was the habitual issue of the first few
movements when performed at a later hour” (quoted in [37]).
Fig. 3. Extended Ideomotor theory. Ideomotor theory assumes a common
coding for the actions and sensory feedback produced. Actions can be invoked
from imagining the sensory consequences of that action. Imitation results
from a similarity match between perceived actions and and the imagined
consequences of that action.
The ideomotor effect is thus where an association is made
between the action and the consequences of this action. When-
ever an action is performed there are a number of perceivable
effects, both local such as kinesthetic/afferent sensations e.g.
the feeling of the movement of one’s fingers and hand, to
more distant/environmental effects, such as a car motor starting
once the ignition key is turned on with your fingers and hand.
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The association works in two directions, firstly that with the
intention to achieve certain effects, certain actions can be
selected. Secondly, that given a certain action, certain effects
can be expected. This is similar to the concepts from control
engineering using paired inverse and forward models [26],
[38], with the inverse model describing the actions required
to achieve given goals and the forward models predicting the
sensory consequences of given actions (and this could provide
a basis for common coding - see below).
Ideomotor theory did not originally address imitation. The
extension is however straightforward; if an action can be
invoked from thinking of it, then it may also be invoked when
perceiving it as performed by someone else. To achieve this
the perception of the event must be in some way similar to the
effect that has been registered when learning the consequences
of an action. One of the key features of ideomotor theory
is that it proposes that the original stimulus and the mental
images that subsequently come to initiate the voluntary action
share a common representational structure and this common
coding approach allows the measures of similarity to take place
between them.
Extended Ideomotor Theory (EIT) as outlined by Prinz [24]
emphasises the role of kinesthetic-visual matching and is
also compatible with ideas of mirror imitation and self-
imitation. The theory encompasses both the willed/intentional
motivations and non-voluntary automatic actions. The issue
of perceptual-motor translation is obviated as both share a
common representational structure (see [39] for some propos-
als on how this may be implemented in the brain). Along
with ASL, ideomotor theory is a generalist theory and as
such is compatible with research on mirror neurons but has
little to offer when explaining neonatal imitation. As prior
learning/experience is at the heart of ideomotor theory the
same mechanisms supporting opaque imitation as proposed in
ASL are presumed to exist here (although the mechanism is
not outlined by Prinz or others). And, as with ASL, ideomotor
theory fails to directly address the correspondence problem.
There are (as far as the author knows) few practical implemen-
tations of EIT in robotic systems (however see [16] for a partial
attempt). Arbib [40] further questions extended ideomotor
theory in respect to the emphasis given to effects (and thus
intention) and suggests an alternative cyclic approach where
neither intention nor pure stimulus-response reaction are given
ascendency. Donald [41] criticises the ideomotor approach
based on neuro-physiological grounds in pointing out that the
vertebrate motor systems do not follow ideomotor principles
in that they are primarily reflexive and thus sensorimotor in
nature.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Apart from Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM), the theories
above base a large part of their explanatory power on the
concepts of prior learning by association and this appears to
concur with evidence from developmental studies. Extended
Ideomotor Theory (EIT) suggests that learning serves as a
mechanism from which the same acts can be (voluntarily)
willed. Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) focuses on how
actions can be replicated. The key difference is that EIT
emphasises effects whereas ASL tends to focus on actions
and states.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of Theories of Imitation. The table summarises how
each theory of imitation deals with the some of the key questions in imitation
research.
The ability of EIT to capture the importance of effects of
actions in experience dependent learning and its ability to
subsequently use similarity measures to invoke these effects
suggests the possibility of imitating actions, states and effects.
In the authors’ view this gives this proposal merit in robotic
architectures. However, this is not to suggest that AIM or ASL
lack merit and in fact aspects of some of these theories have
already been demonstrated in various robotic platforms [25]–
[28], [33], it is simply that they are more restricted in this
regard.
One major difficulty is however none of the proposals
directly address the issues contained in the correspondence
problem. It is probably not coincidental that few robotics
researchers address this problem either, preferring to ‘hard
code’ the mappings instead. Exceptions are firstly the work
by Alissandrakis [42] where the correspondence problem is
investigated in a simulation of dissimilar embodiments; here
however the imitator has access to the full state of the model.
And secondly, work by Johnson and Demiris [43] where
physical robots are used. In this latter research an implicit
perspective transform is used to place the imitator in the
same position as the model. This of course already makes
assumptions about relevant mappings between model and
imitator and as such avoids part of the problem. However after
transformation, the interpretation is based on an abstracting
mechanism which operates by relaxing assumptions on motor
similarity. All of the predicted states of the imitator’s motor
actions (including sub-component actions) are compared with
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perceived next state and the most similar model chosen as
the imitating motor action. This abstracting mechanism (using
forward models) is equivalent to the ideomotor statement of
‘given a certain action, certain effects can be expected’.
This paper has reviewed and compared three important
theories of imitation, an important skill for learning and
adaptation in natural and artificial systems. We hope that this
work will inspire other researchers in developing robots that
can learn from each other and human beings by observation
and/or interaction.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work described in this paper was partially conducted within the EU Integrated
Projects COGNIRON (“The Cognitive Robot Companion”) and ITalk (“Integration and
Transfer of Action and Language in Robots”) funded by the European Commission under
contract numbers FP6-002020 and FP7-214668.
REFERENCES
[1] R. W. Byrne and A. Whiten, “Machiavellian intelligence,” in Machiavel-
lian Intelligence II Extensions and Evaluations, A. Whiten and R. W.
Byrne, Eds. Cambridge University Press, 1997, ch. 1, pp. 1–23.
[2] R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, 1976.
[3] M. Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard
University Press, 1999.
[4] M. Arbib, “The mirror system, imitation, and the evolution of language,”
in Imitation in Animals and Artifacts, K. Dautenhahn and C. L. Nehaniv,
Eds. MIT Press, 2002, pp. 229–280.
[5] A. N. Meltzoff and M. K. Moore, “Persons and representation: why
infant imitation is important for theories of human development,” in
Imitation in Infancy, J. Nadel and G. Butterworth, Eds. Cambridge
University Press, 1999, pp. 9–35.
[6] S. Blackmore, The Meme Machine. Oxford University Press, 1999.
[7] A. N. Meltzoff, “Understanding of the intentions of others: re-enactment
of intended acts by 18-month old children,” Development Psychology,
vol. 31, pp. 838–850, 1995.
[8] K. Dautenhahn, “Trying to imitate – a step towards releasing robots
from social isolation,” in Proc. From Perception to Action Conference,
Lausanne, Switzerland, P. Gaussier and J.-D. Nicoud, Eds. IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1994, pp. 290–301.
[9] M. Brass and C. M. Heyes, “Imitation: is cognitive neuroscience solving
the correspondence problem?” Trends in Cognitive Science, vol. 9, pp.
489–485, 2005.
[10] C. Heyes, “Causes and consequences of imitation,” Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 253–261, 2001.
[11] A. N. Meltzoff and M. K. Moore, “Imitation of facial and manual
gestures by human neonates,” Science, vol. 198, pp. 75–78, 1977.
[12] G. Butterworth, “Neonatal imitation: existence, mechanisms and mo-
tives,” in Imitation in Infancy, J. Nadel and G. Butterworth, Eds.
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 63–88.
[13] A. N. Meltzoff and M. K. Moore, “Explaining facial imitation: A
theoretical approach.” Early Dev. Parent, vol. 6, pp. 179–192, 1997.
[14] M. Anisfeld, “Only tonque protusion modeling is matched by neonates.”
Development Review, vol. 16, pp. 149–161, 1996.
[15] R. W. Mitchell, “Imitation as a perceptual process,” in Imitation in
Animals and Artifacts, K. Dautenhahn and C. L. Nehaniv, Eds. MIT
Press, 2002, pp. 441–470.
[16] J. Saunders, C. L. Nehaniv, K. Dautenhahn, and A. Alissandrakis, “Self-
imitation and environmental scaffolding for robot teaching,” Interna-
tional Journal of Advanced Robotic Systems, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 109–124,
2007.
[17] P. Zukow-Goldring and M. A. Arbib, “Affordances, effectivities and
assisted imitation: Caregivers and the directing of attention,” Neuro-
computing, vol. 70, no. 13-15, 2007.
[18] C. L. Nehaniv and K. Dautenhahn, “The Correspondence Problem,” in
Imitation in Animals and Artifacts, K. Dautenhahn and C. L. Nehaniv,
Eds. MIT Press, 2002, pp. 41–61.
[19] V. Gallese, L. Fadiga, L. Fogassi, and G. Rizzolatti, “Action recognition
in the premotor cortex,” Brain, vol. 119, pp. 593–609, 1996.
[20] G. Rizzolatti and M. A. Arbib, “Language within our grasp,” Trends in
Neurosciences, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 188–194, 1998.
[21] V. Gallese and A. Goldman, “Mirror neurons and the simulation theory
of mind-reading,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 2, no. 12, pp. 493–
501, 1998.
[22] P. Ferrari, S. Rozzi, and L. Fogassi, “Mirror neurons responding to
observation of actions made with tools in monkey ventral premotor
cortex,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 17, pp. 212–226, 2005.
[23] C. M. Heyes and E. D. Ray, “What is the significance of imitation in
animals?” Advances in the Study of Behavior, vol. 29, pp. 215–245,
2000.
[24] W. Prinz, “An ideomotor approach to imitation,” in Perspectives on
Imitation, S. Hurley and N. Chater, Eds. MIT Press, 2005, vol. 1,
pp. 141–156.
[25] J. Demiris, “Movement imitation mechanisms in robots and humans,”
PhD Thesis, Depart. of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh,
1999.
[26] J. Demiris and G. Hayes, “Imitation as a dual-route process featuring
predictive and learning components: A biologically-plausible computa-
tional model,” in Imitation in Animals and Artifacts, K. Dautenhahn and
C. L. Nehaniv, Eds. MIT Press, 2002, pp. 327–361.
[27] C. Breazeal, D. Buchsbaum, J. Gray, D. Gatenby, and B. Blumberg,
“Learning from and about others: Towards using imitation to bootstrap
the social understanding of others by robots,” Artificial Life, vol. 11, no.
1/2, pp. 31–62, 2005.
[28] J. Nadel, A. Revel, P. Andry, and P. Gaussier, “Toward communica-
tion:first imitations in infants, low-functioning children with autism and
robots,” Interaction Studies 5(1), vol. 5, pp. 45–74, 2004.
[29] R. P. N. Rao, A. P. Shon, and A. N. Meltzoff, “A Bayesian model of
imitation in infants and robots,” in Imitation and Social Learning in
Robots, Humans and Animals, C. L. Nehaniv and K. Dautenhahn, Eds.
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[30] C. M. Heyes, “Transformational and associative theories of imitation,”
in Imitation in Animals and Artifacts, K. Dautenhahn and C. L. Nehaniv,
Eds. MIT Press, 2002, pp. 501–523.
[31] A. Whiten, “The Imitative Correspondence Problem: Solved or
Sidestepped?” in Perspectives on Imitation, S. Hurley and N. Chater,
Eds. MIT Press, 2005, ch. 8, pp. 220–222.
[32] B. Galef, “How to Analyze Learning by Imitation?” in Perspectives on
Imitation, S. Hurley and N. Chater, Eds. MIT Press, 2005, ch. 8, pp.
218–220.
[33] S. Calinon and A. Billard, “Learning of gestures by imitation in a
humanoid robot,” in Imitation and Social Learning in Robots, Humans
and Animals, C. L. Nehaniv and K. Dautenhahn, Eds. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
[34] A. Alissandrakis, C. L. Nehaniv, and K. Dautenhahn, “Imitation with
ALICE: Learning to imitate corresponding actions across dissimilar
embodiments,” IEEE Trans. Systems, Man & Cybernetics: Part A,
vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 482–496, 2002.
[35] W. James, The Principles of Psychology. Henry Holt, 1890, reprinted
(1950) Dover.
[36] R. Lotze, Medical Psychology/The Physiology of the Soul. Leipzig:
Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung, 1852, original in German.
[37] A. Taylor, W. Sluckin, D. R. Davies, J. Reason, R. Thomson, and
A. Colman, Introducing Psychology. Penguin Books, 1984.
[38] M. Haruno, D. M. Wolpert, and M. Kawato, “Mosaic model for
sensorimotor learning and control,” Neural Computation, vol. 13, pp.
2201–2220, 2001.
[39] B. Hommel, J. Musseler, G. Aschersleben, and W. Prinz, “The Theory
of Event Coding: A framework for Perception and Action Planning,”
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol. 24, pp. 849–937, 2001.
[40] M. Arbib, “Action, Ideation and Perception,” in Perspectives on Imi-
tation, S. Hurley and N. Chater, Eds. MIT Press, 2005, ch. 8, pp.
215–216.
[41] M. Donald, “The Application of Ideomotor Theory to Imitation,” in
Perspectives on Imitation, S. Hurley and N. Chater, Eds. MIT Press,
2005, ch. 8, pp. 217–218.
[42] A. Alissandrakis, “Imitation and solving the correspondence problem
for dissimilar embodiments - a generic framework,” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Hertfordshire, 2003.
[43] M. Johnson and Y. Demiris, “Abstraction in recognition to solve the
correspondence problem for robot imitation,” in Proceedings of TAROS
(Towards Autonomous Robotic Systems) 2004. University of Essex:
Springer-Verlag, September 2004, pp. 63–70.
14
